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SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST 
AND THE AFTERMATH OF ARIZONA V. 
GANT – A CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO 
GANT’S APPLICABILITY TO NON-
VEHICULAR SEARCHES 
 
Nicholas De Sena* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The nation’s struggle to balance individual rights of 
privacy and legitimate law enforcement efforts continues 
without any clear resolution in sight. The Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, stating 
that search warrants shall be issued only with a showing of 
probable cause, a description of the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.1 Complementing the 
warrant requirement is the principal that searches done 
without a warrant are per se unreasonable.2 The Supreme 
Court, however, has recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement under certain situations, based on various legal 
theories and factual scenarios.3 This article will discuss only 
 
  * Pace Law School, Juris Doctor expected May 2013. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
3. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances 
exception); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile exception); 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory exception); 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent); Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321 (1987) (plain view doctrine); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
(stop and frisk). Additionally, the Court has found various special needs 
exceptions for searches. E.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 
(1967); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325 (1985)). This paper will treat another exception, known as searches 
incident to an arrest. 
1
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one of these exceptions, searches incident to arrest. The 
evolving standards and rules for these searches, their 
significance, how and when they apply, and recent changes in 
the scope of these searches will be the main focus of this article. 
In addition, a circuit split regarding this issue will be discussed 
and analyzed. 
 
II. Background 
 
A. Before Chimel v. California 
 
The basic concept of a search incident to arrest has 
changed throughout the years. In 1950, United States v. 
Rabinowitz was decided by the Supreme Court on the subject of 
searches incident to arrest.4 Albert Rabinowitz, a stamp dealer, 
was arrested and a search incident to arrest took place.5 He 
was arrested in his place of business, a one-room office.6 Upon 
being arrested, the officers searched the defendant’s desk, safe, 
and file cabinets for an hour and a half.7 They seized a large 
amount of incriminating evidence consisting of 573 forged 
stamps, and used it against the defendant at trial.8 The Court 
held this search was valid, even though the purpose was to 
procure incriminating evidence from the defendant, due to the 
“longstanding practice of searching for other proofs of guilt 
within the control of the accused found upon arrest.”9 The 
Court noted that the reasonableness of the search was the 
crucial analysis, not whether or not the officers could have 
procured a search warrant to search all that they had 
searched.10 The Court held that this search, under the 
 
4. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969). 
5. Id. at 58-59. 
6. Id. at 58. 
7. Id. at 58-59. 
8. Id. at 59. 
9. Id. at 61 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)). 
10. Id. at 65-66. The Court explained that there is no fixed formula used 
to determine the reasonableness of a search, and “unreasonable” is not 
defined in the Constitution. Id. at 63 (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). The Court went on to say that 
reasonableness needs to be determined from the facts and circumstances of 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/9
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circumstances, was reasonable, and that the evidence obtained 
from the lengthy search of the office would not be suppressed.11 
 
B. Chimel v. California 
 
The decision in Rabinowitz stood until 1969, when the 
Supreme Court decided the groundbreaking case of Chimel v. 
California.12 In Chimel, the defendant was arrested when he 
walked into his house, where the police were waiting with the 
defendant’s wife who had let them in, and a search “incident to 
arrest” took place thereafter.13 The officers searched the entire 
three-bedroom home, along with the attic, the garage, and a 
small workshop, accompanied by the defendant’s wife.14 In the 
master bedroom and the sewing room, at the officer’s direction, 
the defendant’s wife opened drawers and moved the contents 
around, so the officers could see if there was any incriminating 
evidence in the drawers.15 They found incriminating evidence, 
seized it, and used it against the defendant later at trial.16 The 
search took about forty-five to sixty minutes.17 
 
 
each case. Id. In this case, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the 
District Court that the search was reasonable because the search and seizure 
was incident to a valid arrest. The location of the search was a business room 
where the public, including the police officers, were invited, the room was 
small and under the immediate control of the defendant, the search did not 
extend beyond the room, and the possession of fraudulent and altered stamps 
was a crime. Id. at 63-64. 
11. Id. at 66. 
12. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). This reversal of longstanding precedent could 
arguably be attributable to the liberal nature of the famous “Warren Court” 
in the 1950s and 1960s. See Joan Rapczynski, The Legacy of the Warren 
Court, YALE-NEW HAVEN TEACHERS INSTITUTE, 
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/2004/1/04.01.07.x.html (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
13. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753. 
14. Id. at 754. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. The evidence seized consisted of coins, medals, tokens, and other 
objects, which the police officers believed were stolen. Id. The defendant was 
later charged with burglary and the evidence was received at trial, over the 
defendant’s objection. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and suppressed the evidence. Id. at 768. 
17. Id. at 754. 
3
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The Supreme Court, in Chimel, overturned Rabinowitz and 
stated that the search was not a valid search incident to 
arrest.18 The court noted that there were two justifications for 
searches incident to arrest.19 The first justification was officer’s 
safety.20 When the officer makes an arrest, he needs to be able 
to remove any weapons the arrestee might possess.21 The 
second justification was to prevent the destruction of 
evidence.22 Both of these justifications apply not only to the 
arrestee’s person, but also to any area where the arrestee is 
able to grab, reach, or lunge in order to gain access to a weapon 
or attempt to destroy evidence.23 The court labeled this the 
arrestee’s area of “immediate control.”24 
Because of these rationales for searches incident to arrest, 
the search in Chimel was deemed unreasonable.25 The scope of 
the search went far beyond that which would be reasonable to 
protect the officer’s safety or the destruction of evidence on the 
arrestee’s person or within the area of the arrestee’s immediate 
control.26 The dissent argued that the “exigent circumstances” 
doctrine should apply since the defendant’s wife was present at 
the scene and might have destroyed the evidence when the 
police left.27 The main thrust of Chimel is that a search 
incident to an arrest must be within the area of the arrestee’s 
 
18. Id. at 768. 
19. Id. at 763. These justifications were not new, and were stated in 
Rabinowitz. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1950), overruled 
by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In fact, these justifications can 
be found in court opinions dating back to the 19th century. See, e.g., Closson 
v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482, 484-85 (1867); Holker v. Hennessey, 42 S.W. 1090, 
1092-93 (Mo. 1897). 
20. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id at 768. 
26. Id. at 768. 
27. Id. at 773-75 (White & Black, JJ., dissenting). The exigent 
circumstances doctrine applies when there is an emergency situation, making 
it impracticable to obtain a search or arrest warrant. Id. For example, if an 
officer is chasing a person who has just committed an armed robbery, and 
that person runs into his home before the officer arrests him, due to the 
emergency at hand, the officer may enter the person’s home to make the 
arrest. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/9
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“immediate control,” which greatly narrowed the scope of these 
searches. 
 
C. The Aftermath of Chimel 
 
Although the holding in Chimel was clear on its face, 
questions remained as to certain circumstances in which 
searches incident to an arrest had occurred.28 For example, in 
United States v. Patterson, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit held that police were justified in entering 
the defendant’s kitchen to remove weapons, because the 
defendant’s wife was between the kitchen and living room 
when the defendant was arrested.29 The resulting search and 
seizure of a partially hidden folder on a cabinet shelf in the 
kitchen was lawful as a search incident to the husband’s 
arrest.30 Thus, many different situations can arise in which the 
Chimel rule must be interpreted. 
Other questions also remained after Chimel was decided; it 
remained unclear how long after an arrest a search incident to 
arrest can be made.31 In United States v. Chadwick, this issue 
arose, as the Court held that a search incident to an arrest 
cannot be justified as incident to that arrest if the search was 
remote in time.32 In Chadwick, a footlocker was searched over 
an hour after it was seized, and therefore this search could not 
be justified as a search incident to arrest.33 United States v. 
Edwards, however, provided an exception.34 In Edwards, a 
search incident to arrest of the defendant’s person was allowed 
ten hours after he was arrested since it was deemed improper 
to strip the defendant of his clothing at the time of the arrest 
and leave him naked in his jail cell simply so a search of the 
 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir. 
1971) (discussing the extent of the arrestee’s area of immediate control). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 425. 
31. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), abrogated on other 
grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
32. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15; see also Preston v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364 
(1964). 
33. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. 
34. 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
5
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clothing could be justified as incident to arrest.35 It was late at 
night when the defendant was arrested and no substitute 
clothing could be provided until the next morning.36 Edwards 
was therefore a narrow exception to the normal requirement of 
immediacy when dealing with searches incident to arrest.37 
Yet another crucial question remained after Chimel. The 
cases of Chimel, Patterson, and many others38 dealt with 
defendants who were arrested in their homes and apartments, 
and searches incident to arrest had to be analyzed in these 
similar environments. This paper will discuss the decisions of 
several important cases, which answered the question of 
whether searches incident to arrest could apply to arrests 
outside of the home, particularly whether an arrest could 
justify a search of a defendant’s vehicle if he is arrested after 
he is pulled over, and, if so, what the permissible scope of the 
search is. 
 
D. Vehicular Searches Incident to an Arrest: From 1981 to 
2009 
 
The first major case with respect to searches incident to 
arrest in the automobile context was New York v. Belton, which 
reached the Supreme Court and was decided in 1981.39 Belton 
established a bright line rule that lasted for twenty-eight years 
with respect to searches incident to arrest in the automobile 
context.40 In Belton, the defendant was pulled over for 
speeding.41 As the officer was trying to determine who owned 
the car, he smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope he 
 
35. Id. at 805. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 807. 
38. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. 
Patterson, 447 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. Roberts, 623 N.W.2d 298 
(Neb. 2001). 
39. 453 U.S. 454 (1981), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 
(2009). 
40. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 335 (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis 
did not require the United States Supreme Court to adhere to the broad 
reading of its prior decision in Belton). 
41. Belton, 453 U.S. at 455. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/9
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suspected to contain marijuana in plain view.42 He ordered all 
of the occupants out of the car and arrested them for drug 
possession.43 After searching the occupants, he searched the 
passenger compartment of the car, finding a jacket belonging to 
one of the occupants.44 He unzipped one of the pockets and 
discovered cocaine.45 
The Supreme Court held that this was a lawful search 
incident to arrest.46 The Court held that the scope of the search 
in such a situation can include a search of the passenger 
compartment, as well as any open or closed containers found in 
those compartments.47 While the Court used the rationale that 
the jacket was in the arrestee’s immediate control, it also 
stated that there was no workable definition of the area within 
the immediate control of the arrestee, when that area included 
the interior of an automobile and when the arrestee was a 
recent occupant.48 The Court then went on to say, without 
mentioning the immediate control test, that when an officer 
had made a lawful arrest of the occupant of an automobile, “he 
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile.”49 Therefore, this 
Court implied that, in such a situation, the Chimel “immediate 
control” test need not be used, and a search of the arrestee’s 
automobile will always be reasonable as a search incident to 
arrest.50 This rule survived for nearly three decades, but the 
recent 2009 United States Supreme Court of Arizona v. Gant 
decision changed the Belton rule.51 
 
 
 
 
 
42. Id. at 455-56. 
43. Id. at 456. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 462. 
47. Id. at 460-61. 
48. Id. at 460, 462-63. 
49. Id. at 460 (footnote omitted). 
50. Id. 
51. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
7
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E. Arizona v. Gant 
 
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, 
which made it clear that Belton was no longer the rule for 
searches incident to arrest with respect to automobiles.52 Gant 
established a standard for evaluating such searches based on 
Chimel-like factors.53 Gant was pulled over by the police, 
arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and 
locked in a patrol car.54 The police officers then went back to 
the defendant’s automobile, searched his car, and found cocaine 
in a jacket pocket.55 The Supreme Court used the Chimel rule 
of “immediate control” to decide this case.56 The Court stated 
that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable to 
believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of 
the search.57 Since the two justifications for searches incident 
to an arrest are to prevent the destruction of evidence and that 
of officer safety, this rule seems logical.58 In so holding, the 
Court rejected a broad reading of Belton, which permitted a 
search of a vehicle incident to an arrest even if there was no 
possibility that the arrestee could gain access to the automobile 
at the time of the search.59 In Gant, since the arrestee had 
already been handcuffed and placed inside a police car about 
thirty feet away from his own vehicle, there was no possibility 
that Gant could gain access to his own vehicle.60 
 
 
 
 
52. Id. at 348-51. 
53. Id. at 335. 
54. Id. at 336. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 339. 
57. Id. at 335, 337. The Court stated that a valid search incident to an 
arrest may also be justified if there was reason to believe the vehicle 
contained evidence of the crime the person was arrested for. Id. at 343. This 
“second prong” of the Gant test will be discussed later in this paper. See infra 
Part III.D. 
58. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338. 
59. Id. at 339, 341. 
60. Id. at 336. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/9
DE Sena Final 2/28/2013 11:38 PM 
2013] GANT & NON-VEHICULAR SEARCHES 439 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Alito predicted some 
important unintended consequences to the Court’s ruling.61 
Justice Alito explained that this “immediate control” rule with 
respect to vehicles would require a case-by-case, fact intensive 
analysis, which was exactly what Belton was trying to avoid, 
since it is often unclear whether or not an arrestee could gain 
access to a weapon or evidence in the passenger compartment 
of a car.62 Also, as Justice Alito pointed out, this new rule 
would place a premium on when an officer decides to take the 
arrestee away from the vehicle and place him in a secure police 
car.63 In attempting to make the search a lawful search 
incident to an arrest, this rule would “‘create a perverse 
incentive for an arresting officer to prolong the period during 
which the arrestee is kept in an area where he could pose a 
danger to the officer.’”64 Although Justice Alito’s concerns were 
valid, the majority was not persuaded that these concerns 
should affect its decision. 
The Gant rule created more restraints on police officers 
with regard to searches of automobiles incident to an arrest. If 
the arrestee was secured and there was no possibility that he 
could gain access to his vehicle, any search of his vehicle 
thereafter could not be justified as a search incident to his 
arrest.65 Although this rule seems clear, circuit courts have 
struggled with interpreting and applying the rule, especially in 
the context of non-vehicular searches.66 
 
 
 
 
61. Id. at 359-61 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 360. 
63. Id. at 362. 
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 669 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996)). 
65. Id. at 337-38 (majority opinion); Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2419 (2011). The facts of Davis are analogous to the facts of Gant, as an 
arrestee was removed from his vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in a police car 
before the subsequent search of his vehicle occurred. Id. at 2425. In this case, 
the search would have been invalidated, but was held to be valid for other 
reasons, namely, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
66. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
9
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III. The Aftermath of Gant: Applicability to Non-Vehicular 
Searches 
 
A. Circuit Split 
 
While the ruling in Gant clearly applies to automobile 
searches incident to an arrest, the question remains whether 
Gant should apply to non-vehicular searches incident to an 
arrest. Recent circuit court decisions have differed on the 
answer to this question. A circuit split was recognized in the 
Fifth Circuit’s March 2011 decision United States v. Curtis.67 
The Curtis court analyzed the Gant decision and explained that 
other circuit courts were divided over whether Gant applied 
only to vehicular searches incident to arrest or whether it 
applied to all searches incident to arrest.68 Although Curtis 
dealt with a situation which appeared to require interpretation 
of the scope of Gant relating to non-vehicular searches, the 
court denied the motion to suppress based on the exclusionary 
rule’s good faith exception, and thus did not decide if Gant was 
applicable.69 
The Eighth Circuit and the Third Circuit are split on the 
issue of the applicability of Gant to non-vehicular searches.70 
The Eighth Circuit case United States v. Perdoma is an 
important case in this discussion, because the Eighth Circuit 
interpreted Gant as not applicable to non-vehicular searches.71 
In Perdoma, the defendant was arrested on drug charges in the 
middle of a bus terminal.72 The officers handcuffed him and 
brought him to an area at the rear of the terminal.73 One officer 
searched Perdoma and found marijuana, while another officer 
searched Perdoma’s bag and found methamphetamine.74 
 
67. 635 F.3d 704, 713 (5th Cir. 2011). In Curtis, the defendant was 
arrested in his car, and the arresting officer took his cell phone, looked 
through it, and continued to do so long after the arrest was finished. Id. at 
711. 
68. Id. at 713. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. n.22; United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2010). 
71. Perdoma, 621 F.3d at 751. 
72. Id. at 748. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/9
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Perdoma argued that he was “secured” like the defendant in 
Gant, so the subsequent search of his duffle bag should not 
have been allowed.75 The court stated that, while the 
explanation of Gant of the rationale for searches incident to an 
arrest may be instructive regarding outside of vehicle searches, 
the court declined to adopt Gant in this situation.76 The court 
reasoned that, even though Perdoma was “secured,” the bag 
was in close proximity to him, and the police did not know how 
strong he was.77 Thus, the search was upheld as valid, and the 
Court did not interpret Gant as applicable to non-vehicular 
searches.78 
The Third Circuit case, United States v. Shakir, came to a 
different conclusion in determining whether Gant applies to 
non-vehicular searches.79 In Shakir, an arrest warrant for the 
defendant had been issued.80 An arrest team was supposed to 
arrest the defendant at the Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino.81 
Soon after the defendant entered the lobby of the hotel, the 
arresting officer spotted the defendant standing at the end of a 
check-in-line about twenty-five feet away.82 As the officer got 
closer, somebody yelled out “shit!,” and the defendant turned 
and made eye contact with the man who had yelled.83 Two 
security guards, who were accompanying the arresting officer, 
detained the man who yelled and the arresting officer hurried 
over to Shakir and arrested him as well.84 Shakir did not resist, 
and dropped the bag he was carrying on the floor at his feet.85 
Shakir was immediately patted down and was cooperative 
 
75. Id. at 751. The defendant in Gant was better “secured” than the 
defendant in Perdoma and was completely removed from the area being 
searched before the search was conducted. Id. In Gant, the defendant was 
handcuffed and locked in a patrol car before the officers searched his car. 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). 
76. Perdoma, 621 F.3d at 751. 
77. Id. at 750-51. 
78. Id. at 751. 
79. 616 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2010). 
80. Id. at 316. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
11
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throughout the arrest.86 Within five minutes, two more officers 
arrived with handcuffs.87 While the other officers held Shakir’s 
arms, the arresting officer bent down to investigate the 
contents of Shakir’s bag, which was still by his feet, and found 
a large amount of cash.88 
With respect to Gant, the Third Circuit stated that “the 
Government contends that the rule of Gant applies only to 
vehicle searches. We do not read Gant so narrowly.”89 The court 
went on to say that, in Gant, the Supreme Court “‘h[e]ld that 
the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle 
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is 
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search.’”90 The court stated that 
an aggressive reading of Gant would prohibit the search of the 
bag in this case, unless Shakir was both unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the bag.91 The court declined to adopt such 
an aggressive reading, even though they applied Gant.92 
The court also noted that there was no definition of what 
“secured” meant in Gant.93 The court stated that handcuffs are 
not fail-safe, and it is not impossible for a handcuffed person to 
obtain and use a weapon concealed on his person or within his 
reach.94 Therefore, the court applied Gant, but the court took a 
middle ground approach in doing so.95 It implied that, if the 
 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 316-17. 
88. Id. at 317. It was later determined that some of the cash was stolen 
during an armed robbery, and, at trial, Shakir moved to suppress the cash 
found in his bag during the search. Id. 
89. Id. at 318. 
90. Id. at 319-20 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)). 
91. Id. at 320. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. In Gant, the defendant was handcuffed and secured in a police 
car at the time of the search. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). 
94. Shakir, 616 F.3d at 320-21 (citing United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 
200, 209 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
95. Id. at 321. The circuit split regarding Gant was mentioned in the 
district court case United States v. Cartwright, No. 10-CR-104-CVE, 2010 WL 
3931102, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2010). There the court stated that the 
Tenth Circuit had not yet ruled on the issue of whether Gant should apply to 
non-vehicular searches. Id. at *9. The court concluded that, post-Gant, the 
standard remains lenient in determining whether an arrestee can reasonably 
access an area or item being searched incident to the arrest, and the inquiry 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/9
DE Sena Final 2/28/2013 11:38 PM 
2013] GANT & NON-VEHICULAR SEARCHES 443 
defendant was truly secured like the defendant in Gant, the 
search of the bag would have been invalid.96 The court held 
that since the bag was still at his feet, the defendant could 
have still accessed his bag.97 The court concluded that the 
totality of circumstances, including the defendant’s arrest for 
an armed bank robbery and the possibility of a confederate in 
the hotel lobby at the time of his arrest, made the search of his 
bag valid incident to arrest.98 Thus, the Third Circuit ruled 
that Gant applied to non-vehicular searches, contrary to the 
pronouncements of the Eighth Circuit in Perdoma.99 
 
B. Courts Applying Gant or Indicating that Gant Would Apply 
to Non-Vehicular Searches Incident to Arrest 
 
The issue of whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant 
should apply to non-vehicular searches remains an open 
question. There are a number of district court decisions and 
some appellate court decisions which answer this question in 
the affirmative.100 In United States v. Bennett, the police 
suspected the defendant had committed an attempted 
robbery.101 A police officer saw the defendant running down a 
street and the defendant was soon tackled by two police 
officers.102 Upon being tackled, the backpack that the 
 
cannot stop simply because an arrestee is handcuffed or secured. Id. The 
court also seemed to apply Gant’s justifications of officer safety and evidence 
preservation, and, in doing so, appeared to be applying and interpreting Gant 
as was done by the Third Circuit in Shakir. Id.; see also Shakir, 616 F.3d at 
320. 
96. Shakir, 616 F.3d at 320. 
97. Id. at 321. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 318; see United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, No. 08-535, 2010 WL 1427593 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2010); United States v. Scott, No. 09 CR 331(HB), 2009 WL 
4975269 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009); United States v. Snard, No. 09-cr-00212, 
2009 WL 3105271 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2009); United States v. McGhee, No. 
8:09CR31, 2009 WL 2424104 (D. Neb. July 21, 2009); People v. Brown, No. 
B213110, 2009 WL 3193993 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009); State v. Lussier, 770 
N.W.2d 581(Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
101. Bennett, 2010 WL 1427593, at *1. 
102. Id. at *2-3. 
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defendant was carrying fell off of his shoulder.103 After tackling 
him, and with the defendant on the ground, one officer pointed 
his gun at the defendant and the other officer pinned the 
defendant down, frisked him, arrested him, and handcuffed 
him.104 Subsequently, one officer picked up the backpack, 
noticed it was heavy, and searched the backpack, in which he 
discovered a gun.105 The defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence, arguing that the backpack was not searched incident 
to his arrest.106 The court, in deciding whether the backpack 
was within the arrestee’s immediate control, looked to United 
States v. Myers.107 In Myers, police officers searched the 
defendant’s bag while the defendant was lying face down on the 
floor, handcuffed, and had two armed police officers hovering 
over him.108 The Myers court found that the bag was not 
searched incident to an arrest since the bag was not within the 
defendant’s immediate control due to the defendant being 
secured.109 The same rationale applied in the Bennett case, and 
the same conclusion was reached. The Bennett court, applying 
Gant, stated that, when determining whether an object is 
accessible to an arrestee, a court should assume that “[the 
arrestee] was neither an acrobat [nor] a Houdini.”110 This is 
another way of saying that, once an arrestee is lying faced 
down and handcuffed, there is no conceivable way that the 
arrestee could access any bag or container, even if it was within 
his reach, and no search incident to the arrest would be 
justified in those circumstances. Therefore, because the court 
applied Gant and found that the defendant was secured and 
did not have access to the backpack, the search was 
invalidated.111 Other cases with similar facts have come to the 
same conclusion.112 
 
103. Id. at *3. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at *1. 
107. 308 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2002). 
108. Id. at 267. 
109. Id. 
110. Bennett, 2010 WL 1427593, at *5 (quoting Myers, 308 F.3d at 267). 
111. Id. at *5-6. 
112. United States v. Scott, No. 09 CR 331(HB), 2009 WL 4975269, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009); see also United States v. Morillo, No. 08 CR 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/9
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United States v. Scott, for example, also held that when a 
defendant is secured and does not have access to his 
belongings, the search will be invalidated.113 In Scott, the 
defendant was arrested and the bag he was carrying was 
brought to the police station without being searched.114 Later, 
when the defendant was being interrogated, the police officers 
brought the bag into the interrogation room and searched it, 
claiming it was incident to the defendant’s arrest.115 Applying 
Gant to this non-vehicular search, the court held that the 
search was invalid.116 The court stated that once the bag was 
taken from the defendant at the scene of the arrest, a later 
search of the bag could not be justified as a search incident to 
arrest since the worries of officer safety and preservation of 
evidence were no longer present.117 Also, the officers were “not 
allowed to simulate circumstances warranting application of 
the incident-to-arrest exception merely by bringing the item 
they wish to search into the area near where the person was 
arrested, or vice versa.”118 Therefore, applying Gant to this 
situation, the search of the bag was not valid as a search 
incident to arrest. 
In United States v. Snard, the court applied Gant as well, 
but the search was still found to be valid as a search incident to 
arrest.119 In Snard, the police, with a warrant, went to the 
defendant’s apartment to arrest him for drug possession, and 
 
676(NGG), 2009 WL 3254431, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009). In Morillo, the 
defendant, wearing a backpack, fled an attempted arrest on his bicycle while 
police were pursuing him. Id. at *1. The defendant crashed his bicycle in a 
pothole and continued fleeing on foot. Id. Police officers eventually tackled 
him and his backpack fell off of his shoulder. Id. He was then handcuffed and 
brought to the back of a police car with his backpack. Id. The backpack was 
then searched. Id. The court disallowed the search, because there was no 
possibility that the defendant could have gained access to the backpack 
during the time of the search. Id. at *2. 
113. No. 09 CR 331(HB), 2009 WL 4975269, at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 
2009). 
114. Id. at *1. 
115. Id. at *2. 
116. Id. at *7. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. (quoting United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 
1993)). 
119. No. 09-cr-00212, 2009 WL 3105271, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2009). 
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they were warned that the defendant might be armed.120 The 
police knocked and Snard finally answered the door after 
telling the police, “just a minute.”121 Thereafter, while still in 
the defendant’s apartment, the police arrested and handcuffed 
the defendant.122 The defendant then said, “Can I get my 
clothes?” and quickly walked to his bed and sat down.123 The 
officers followed him and told him to stand up and walk back to 
the doorway.124 One officer noticed drugs in the room and 
decided that a protective sweep should be done to make sure 
that nobody else was in the apartment.125 The police officer 
lifted the mattress to look under the bed.126 He did not want to 
stick his foot under the bed, nor did he want to get down on all 
fours to check for additional persons in the room, as it would 
have placed him in a vulnerable position.127 Upon lifting the 
mattress, a gun was exposed.128 Applying Gant to this non-
vehicular situation, the court nonetheless validated the search 
incident to the defendant’s arrest.129 Due to the defendant’s 
long delay in answering the door, his walking quickly to the 
bed after being handcuffed, the drugs in plain view, and the 
warning that he might he armed, the search of the bed was 
valid to protect the officers’ safety.130 This case shows that even 
if a court applies Gant to non-vehicular searches, the search 
can still be validated as incident to an arrest, even if the 
defendant is handcuffed, as he was in this case.131 
A different situation arose in United States v. McGhee, in 
which the district court applied Gant.132 In McGhee, the 
defendant was arrested and the police searched his person 
 
120. Id. at *2-3. 
121. Id. at *3. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at *4. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at *11. 
130. Id. at *6-7. 
131. Id. at *10. 
132. No. 8:09CR31, 2009 WL 2424104, at *1 (D. Neb. July 21, 2009). 
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incident to the arrest, and found a cell phone in his pocket.133 
The police then searched the phone and copied the saved 
contact list in the phone.134 The court concluded that this was 
not a valid search incident to the defendant’s arrest.135 
Although the search of his person was justified, the additional 
search of the numbers and contacts in the phone was not.136 
The court applied Gant, and noted that “‘[i]f there is no 
possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law 
enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule 
does not apply.’”137 The court stated that, although the cell 
phone was within the defendant’s immediate control at the 
time the defendant was searched, once the officer seized the 
phone, there was no evidence that the cell phone contained any 
destructible evidence or that the cell phone presented any risk 
of harm to the officers.138 Therefore, since the justifications for 
searches incident to an arrest were not present during the 
search of the cell phone, the search was not a valid search 
incident to the defendant’s arrest.139 
In the case of People v. Brown, the Gant analysis was 
applied to a different set of facts.140 In Brown, the defendant 
was arrested in his motel room after police officers smelled and 
observed large amounts of smoke, which they determined to be 
marijuana.141 The motel room was then searched and evidence 
of the crime was discovered.142 The defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence, claiming that the search was not valid 
incident to his arrest.143 Although the evidence was admitted 
for other reasons, the court determined that this search was 
not a valid search incident to the defendant’s arrest.144 The 
 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at *2. 
135. Id. at *3. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009)). 
138. Id. at *3. 
139. Id. 
140. No. B213110, 2009 WL 3193993, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at *3. 
144. Id. at *4. 
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court applied Gant to this non-vehicular case.145 The court 
stated the immediate control test, commented on the issue of a 
secured defendant as discussed in Gant, and noted the 
justifications of officer safety and evidence preservation.146 In 
its analysis, the court concluded that the search of the motel 
room was not a valid search incident to the defendant’s 
arrest.147 After the defendant was arrested, he was taken 
outside of his motel room.148 Once the defendant was outside, 
the officers searched the motel room.149 At that point, with the 
defendant standing outside, there was no reason to believe that 
the defendant had access to or could reach anything in the 
motel room or that he would be able to destroy any evidence in 
the motel room.150 Therefore, under Gant, the court concluded 
that the search was invalid as a search incident to arrest since 
there were no circumstances that would justify such a 
search.151 
In a unique set of circumstances, a Minnesota appellate 
court applied Gant to a non-vehicular search in State v. 
Lussier.152 In this case, the defendant was arrested on probable 
cause that he had recently committed a rape.153 After he was 
arrested, the defendant was placed in the back of a police car 
and was driven to a hospital to undergo a Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) exam.154 At the hospital, the 
defendant’s clothes and underwear were collected as evidence, 
and at 5:00 A.M., his pubic hair was combed, pubic hair samples 
were collected, and his cheek, hands, and penis were 
swabbed.155 Defendant claimed that this exam was not a lawful 
 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at *3-4. 
147. Id. at *4. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at *1. 
150. Id. at *4. 
151. Id.; see also People v. Leal, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding, under similar circumstances, that the search of an area in the 
defendant’s home where he was arrested was invalid under Gant because the 
defendant had already been secured and removed from the scene when the 
search took place). 
152. 770 N.W.2d 581(Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
153. Id. at 583-84. 
154. Id. at 584-85. 
155. Id. at 585. 
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search incident to his arrest, and the court agreed.156 The 
officers argued that this was a lawful search incident to arrest 
because of the danger of DNA evidence easily being destroyed 
by washing the area but the court disagreed.157 The court first 
noted that this case was distinguishable from State v. Riley, 
wherein a close visual inspection of the defendant’s penis was 
conducted the day following his arrest.158 In this case, a much 
more intrusive search was done, as opposed to simply a visual 
inspection.159 The court also applied Gant to this analysis, 
stating that the defendant’s genitals could not be accessed in 
this situation, since he was handcuffed and was under constant 
police observation.160 Officer safety and the preservation of 
evidence, justifications of a search incident to arrest, were not 
present.161 Thus, an incident to arrest rationale could not be 
used to justify the search.162 
These are just some examples of cases in the lower courts 
that have applied the Gant rule to non-vehicular searches. 
These cases have not reached the Supreme Court of the United 
States, but the holdings and rationale used by these courts are 
clear. Other lower courts, however, have decided not to apply 
Gant to non-vehicular cases, and have adopted a less broad 
application of Gant, limiting its scope to cases regarding 
vehicular searches.163 
 
156. Id. at 585-86, 590. 
157. Id. at 587-88. 
158. Id. at 589 (citing State v. Riley, 226 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Minn. 
1975)). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id.; see also United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 384 
(D.D.C. 1957) (affirming that an examination of the defendant’s penis and 
testing for blood evidence following an arrest for sexual assault requires “the 
most scrupulous observation of propriety and decency”); State v. Fontenot, 
383 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. 1980) (holding that the retrieval of a container from 
the defendant’s vagina after she was arrested was not a lawful search 
incident to her arrest since a warrant could have been obtained in one to two 
hours and because the arrestee was heavily guarded by police, therefore no 
destruction of evidence would have been possible). 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, No. 2:09-cr-182-MEF, 2010 WL 
749908 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2010); United States v. Briones, No. H-09-491, 
2009 WL 5208835 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2009); United States v. Patterson, No. 
09-cr-503, 2009 WL 3578955 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009); Sanders v. City of 
19
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C. Courts Declining to Apply Gant to Non-Vehicular Searches 
Incident to Arrest 
 
Although some courts have decided to apply Gant to non-
vehicular searches, many lower courts have not chosen to do so. 
These cases are important to show that the scope of Gant is not 
clear, and that courts in different jurisdictions are interpreting 
Gant as they see fit, since no specific guidelines have been 
given as to whether Gant should apply to non-vehicular 
searches. United States v. Patterson is a case in which Gant 
was not applied. In Patterson, police officers arrested the 
defendant in his two-bedroom apartment pursuant to an arrest 
warrant.164 The defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and 
removed from the apartment.165 The police asked the 
defendant’s girlfriend if there were any weapons in the 
apartment, and upon receiving a vague answer, searched a 
closet in the apartment.166 They found an AK-47 rifle in the 
closet.167 The defendant claimed that Gant should apply to this 
case because he was secured and removed from the apartment 
before the search of the closet commenced.168 The court, 
however, declined to apply Gant in this situation.169 The court 
explained that Gant should be limited to searches incident to 
arrest involving vehicle searches, and should not be extended 
to searches outside of the vehicle context.170 The court therefore 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the weapon.171 The 
importance of the scope of Gant, as seen in this case, is crucial. 
If Gant was applied to this case, the evidence would have most 
likely been suppressed since the defendant was secured and 
removed from the apartment before the search of the closet. In 
 
Bakersfield, No. CIV-F 04-5541 AWI BAK, 2009 WL 3300253 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 
14, 2009); State v. McKay, 154 Wn. App. 1010; No. 38816-2-II, 2010 Wash. 
App. LEXIS 114 (Jan. 12, 2010); State v. Sero, 153 Wn. App. 1001; No. 35617-
1-II, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 2956 (Nov. 10, 2009). 
164. No. 09-cr-503, 2009 WL 3578955, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at *2. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at *3. 
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not applying Gant, however, the court found that the Fourth 
Amendment was not violated, and the evidence was 
admissible.172 
United States v. Briones is another case in which the court 
declined to apply Gant.173 In this case, the defendant was 
arrested in his home pursuant to an arrest warrant.174 He was 
handcuffed and removed from the premises.175 The defendant 
then asked the officers for a shirt and shoes, and told them 
they were located near his bed in his room.176 The officers went 
to his room to get these items, and saw a pistol, a rifle, 
ammunition, and an armored vest.177 The items were seized 
and offered into evidence at trial, to which the defendant 
objected.178 The defendant argued that Gant should apply, and 
contended that searches of premises incident to an arrest are 
only allowed if the defendant is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the searched area at the time of the search.179 The 
court, however, declined to read Gant as “an indication of a 
new trend by the Supreme Court to limit the scope of 
reasonable searches in connection with arrests,” and was not 
persuaded by any such argument.180 This case exemplifies the 
importance of the scope of Gant, because if Gant was applied, 
crucial evidence of weapons, ammunition, and a bulletproof 
vest would have likely been suppressed, and the outcome of the 
case might have been affected. 
 
172. Id. In another case decided by the same court, United States v. 
Harris, a defendant was arrested and secured as he was coming out of his 
bedroom, and there was a subsequent search of the mattress in the bedroom. 
No. 09 CR 0028-2, 2009 WL 3055331, at *1, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2009). At 
the time of the arrest, the mattress was within the defendant’s grabbing 
radius, but before the search took place, the defendant was removed from the 
bedroom (the mattress was therefore not accessible at the time of the search). 
Id. The court nevertheless declined to apply Gant in this non-vehicular 
context. Id. at *4. The court read Gant to apply strictly to vehicular searches. 
Id. 
173. No. H-09-491, 2009 WL 5208835, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2009). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at *3. 
180. Id. 
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The court in Sanders v. Bakersfield also declined to apply 
Gant. In Sanders, the plaintiffs were handcuffed and arrested 
in their apartment.181 The officers subsequently searched the 
premises and found cocaine in a shoe within a bedroom 
closet.182 The plaintiffs claimed that this search exceeded any 
justifiable search incident to their arrest, and urged that Gant 
be applied in this situation.183 The court, however, decided that 
Gant should not apply to non-vehicular searches.184 The court 
stressed that a Gant situation involving a vehicular search is 
very different than a non-Gant situation.185 The court noted 
that the nature of space within a car, as in Gant, is much 
smaller than in other circumstances.186 For example, an officer 
can usually tell right away if there is another person sitting in 
the arrestee’s car who might pose a threat of danger to the 
officers.187 In a Sanders situation, however, this is not the 
case.188 In Sanders, the officers were allowed to do a “protective 
sweep” of the premises as part of their search incident to the 
arrest for the purpose of officer safety to make sure no one else 
was hiding in the apartment who might pose an additional 
danger to the police officers, a circumstance not present in 
Gant.189 For this primary reason, the court noted, Gant should 
not apply to non-vehicular searches because the surrounding 
circumstances are different.190 This case shows an important 
reason why some courts might choose not to apply Gant to non-
vehicular searches. 
The case of United States v. Bowman reached a similar 
result.191 In Bowman, the police entered a mobile home 
 
181. No. CIV-F 04-5541 AWI BAK, 2009 WL 3300253, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 
Oct. 14, 2009). Plaintiffs in this case filed suit, claiming that their Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at *1-2. 
184. Id. at *3. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. No. 2:09-cr-182-MEF, 2010 WL 749908, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 
2010). 
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pursuant to an arrest warrant for the defendant.192 The 
defendant and a young woman were lying on a couch in the 
living room when the officers arrived.193 The officers rolled 
Bowman off the couch and onto the floor, about four or five feet 
away from the couch.194 The woman was also placed on the 
floor, about three to four feet away from the couch.195 After 
Bowman was handcuffed, one officer lifted up a couch cushion 
and searched the couch.196 He found a .25 caliber pistol and 
seized the weapon.197 The defendant urged that Gant should 
apply to this case.198 He argued that, since he was handcuffed 
and was five feet away from the couch, he had no access to the 
couch at the time of the search, and a search of the couch 
incident to his arrest should therefore be invalid.199 The court 
was not persuaded by this argument and refused to apply Gant 
to this non-vehicular search.200 The motion to suppress was 
accordingly denied.201 This case differs from Sanders because 
the defendant in this case was not removed from the area when 
the search was conducted, which was not the case in Sanders. 
However, this did not seem to matter because the court’s 
narrow reading of Gant would limit Gant’s scope strictly to 
vehicular searches. Similar to other cases in which courts did 
not apply Gant to non-vehicular searches incident to arrest, if 
Gant was applied here, the evidence would have most likely 
been suppressed, since the defendant was “secured,” lying face 
down on the floor five feet away from the couch, and therefore 
did not have access to the couch under a Gant analysis.202 
Thus, the significance of the scope of Gant and how far it 
should extend is apparent. 
 
 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at *3. 
199. Id. at *4. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. See generally United States v. Bowman, No. 2:09-cr-182-MEF, 2010 
WL 749908, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2010). 
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Two other cases decided by the Washington Court of 
Appeals are worthy of comment. In the first case, State v. 
McKay, the defendant was arrested and placed in the back of a 
police patrol car.203 The bag he was carrying was subsequently 
searched by one of the arresting police officers.204 The court 
stated that the bag was in McKay’s immediate control at the 
time of the search and declined to apply Gant since this was a 
non-vehicular search.205 In the second case, State v. Sero, the 
defendant was arrested in her motel room.206 The police found 
her hiding inside a couch in the motel room.207 The officers 
arrested her, removed her from the room, went back inside the 
motel room, searched the couch, and found incriminating 
evidence.208 This court also declined to apply Gant to this non-
vehicular search incident to the defendant’s arrest since the 
search occurred in a motel room, not a vehicle.209 
It is evident after reading and analyzing these lower court 
decisions that the question of whether Gant should apply to 
non-vehicular searches incident to an arrest is still unclear. If 
lower courts interpret Gant broadly, they would likely apply 
Gant to non-vehicular searches incident to an arrest, but if 
they read the decision more narrowly, they would likely not 
apply it to non-vehicular searches incident to arrest. 
 
D. Cases Distinguishing Prongs of Gant 
 
In Arizona v. Gant, the Court described two separate 
prongs in which a search could be justified in the automobile 
context incident to a defendant’s arrest.210 First, the Court 
stated that an officer may search the passenger compartment 
of a vehicle incident to an arrest if it is reasonable to believe 
 
203. 154 Wn. App. 1010; No. 38816-2-II, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 114, *1 
(Jan. 12, 2010). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at *2. 
206. 153 Wn. App. 1001; No. 35617-1-II, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 2956, 
*1 (Nov. 10, 2009). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at *2. 
210. 556 U.S. 332, 339-41 (2009). 
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that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the 
search.211 Second, the Court stated that such a search may also 
be justified if there was reason to believe the automobile 
contained evidence of the crime the defendant was arrested 
for.212 The following cases discuss the meaning and interplay of 
these prongs. The cases also answer the interesting question of 
whether both prongs must be applied if the court determines 
that Gant is applicable to the situation. 
In People v. Matthews, the defendant was arrested in his 
motel room.213 He was then taken out of the motel room and 
placed in a police squad car.214 His girlfriend, who was staying 
with the defendant, was also arrested.215 She was handcuffed 
and seated on the bed in the motel room.216 After the arrests, 
one officer saw a knit cap on the floor a few feet from where the 
defendant’s girlfriend was sitting.217 He picked it up and, when 
he looked inside, found drug paraphernalia.218 The question 
before the court was whether this was a reasonable search 
incident to the defendant’s arrest, or the defendant’s 
girlfriend’s arrest.219 The court applied Gant to this non-
vehicular search and, in doing so, the search was found to be 
invalid.220 The search could not be justified as incident to the 
defendant’s arrest because he was secured in a patrol car when 
the search took place.221 The search also could not be justified 
as incident to the defendant’s girlfriend’s arrest, even though 
the knit cap was only several feet away from her.222 This was so 
because she was handcuffed and two armed officers were 
standing beside her, leaving her no opportunity to access the 
knit cap.223 
 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. No. H033568, 2010 WL 468105, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at *4-6. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at *6. 
223. Id. 
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The prosecution made an additional argument in this case, 
urging that, even if Gant was applied to this case, the search 
should be valid because there was reason to believe that 
evidence relevant to the crime would be found at the scene.224 
In Gant, the court stated that a valid search can be conducted 
if it is done incident to the defendant’s arrest or if there is 
reason to believe that the car contained evidence of the crime 
for which the defendant was arrested.225 However, in 
Matthews, the court refused to apply this second prong of 
Gant.226 The court seemed to say that there was a difference 
between a reasonable belief that the premises contains 
evidence of a crime and preventing the destruction of evidence, 
the latter being one of the justifications for searches incident to 
an arrest.227 The court also noted that, even though they were 
applying the first prong of Gant to this case, the second prong, 
concerning reason to believe that evidence of a crime is located 
on the premises, should not be applied.228 The court stated that, 
if the defendant’s girlfriend had been arrested in her car for a 
drug related offense, the police could have searched the car for 
drug evidence without a warrant, even after she was arrested, 
handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car.229 The court made it 
clear, however, that this rule only applied to automobile 
searches.230 
Although not stated in the decision, this is what is known 
as the “automobile exception.”231 The justification for this 
exception to the warrant requirement is the inherent mobility 
of automobiles, which makes the danger of the destruction of 
evidence much higher than in other circumstances.232 The 
Supreme Court, in Chambers, stated that the mobility of a car 
may make the warrantless search of it reasonable, “‘although 
the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store, 
 
224. Id. at *7. 
225. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
226. Matthews, 2010 WL 468105, at *6. 
227. See id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at *8. 
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231. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62 (1970). 
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or other fixed piece of property.’”233 This relates back to 
Matthews, because a motel room is not inherently mobile; the 
court thus declined to apply this prong of Gant.234 The court’s 
application of Gant was therefore very unique, in that it chose 
to apply Gant because the defendant’s girlfriend was secured 
and had no access to the knit cap (search incident to arrest 
therefore not allowed), but declined to apply Gant with respect 
to the second prong as to the reasonable belief that the 
premises contained evidence of a crime.235 The confusing 
questions of applicability along with the scope of Gant are 
therefore highlighted in this case. Although somewhat 
confusing, this court’s analysis and partial application of Gant 
does make sense for the reasons stated above. 
Another case where the court applied the first prong of 
Gant but declined to apply the second prong of Gant was 
United States v. Taylor.236 In Taylor, the defendant was 
arrested in his attic, where he was found hiding from the 
arresting officers.237 The defendant was then handcuffed and 
taken to the police squad car outside the home.238 
Subsequently, one officer went back inside the defendant’s 
house to look for contraband and weapons, which he found.239 
The court decided to apply the first prong of Gant to this 
situation,240 stating that, since the defendant no longer had 
access to anything in his home, the subsequent search of the 
house was not a valid search incident to the defendant’s 
arrest.241 The court reasoned that Gant did not specifically 
state that it should only apply to vehicular searches, and thus 
decided to apply it in the non-vehicular context as well.242 The 
government then argued, as in Matthews, that, if Gant is 
applied, the second prong regarding reasonable belief that the 
 
233. Id. (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967)). 
234. People v. Matthews, No. H033568, 2010 WL 468105, at *6 (Cal. Ct. 
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premises contained evidence of the crime also should be 
applied.243 Otherwise, the government argued, Gant is being 
read two different ways and is not being applied consistently.244 
The court disagreed with this argument, and, like the court in 
Matthews, applied the first prong but declined to apply the 
second prong.245 The court followed the recommendation of the 
Magistrate Judge, who stated that the second prong, although 
applicable in the automobile context, should not be applied in 
other situations such as this one, due to a heightened 
expectation of privacy in one’s home.246 Whether one agrees 
that the first prong of Gant should apply to non-vehicular 
searches, it seems logical to apply the second prong strictly in 
the automobile context, due to an automobile’s inherent 
mobility and a greater expectation of privacy in a person’s 
home as opposed to a person’s automobile. 
 
E. The Effect of Gant on Police Practices 
 
The rule that was crafted in Gant has major implications 
as to whether evidence obtained will be suppressed or admitted 
at trial. With respect to automobiles, under the old Belton rule, 
any search of the arrestee’s automobile after he or she was 
arrested was allowed, regardless of whether the arrestee had 
been secured.247 After Gant, such a search would not be allowed 
if the arrestee was secured and did not have access to the 
vehicle, unless the officers had reason to believe the vehicle 
contained evidence of the offense for which the arrest had been 
made.248 The question remains whether this change will have 
an effect on how police officers act in these situations. 
Any time an individual is being arrested, a dangerous 
situation has been created: the arrestee might try to flee, or 
might even attempt to harm the arresting officer if the arrestee 
is in a state of desperation and wants to avoid detention. 
Placing handcuffs on these individuals and securing them so 
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244. Id. 
245. Id. at 1002-03. 
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247. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981). 
248. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-50 (2009). 
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that they will pose no threat to the arresting officer is 
important for officer safety. However, after the Gant decision, 
with respect to automobile searches incident to an arrest, 
officers will be punished for securing these individuals before 
searching their vehicles incident to their arrest.249 If they first 
secure the individual, the subsequent search of the car will be 
invalidated if the arrestee no longer has “access” to the 
vehicle.250 However, if they wait to secure him, and search the 
vehicle first in an attempt to obtain more evidence, the arrestee 
is still unsecured and poses a threat to the arresting officers.251 
The actual effect of Gant thus appears contradictory. If the 
officers are more concerned about their safety, they should first 
secure the individual, which would not allow them to 
subsequently search the arrestee’s vehicle incident to the 
arrest.252 However, if the officers want to gather as much 
evidence as possible, they should wait to secure him and search 
the vehicle first. Due to this contradiction, officers will have to 
make spur of the moment decisions about when to secure the 
arrestee and when to search his or her vehicle incident to 
arrest. 
If Gant was to apply to non-vehicular searches, the effect is 
arguably even more dramatic. For example, if an officer arrests 
an individual in that individual’s bedroom, questions will arise 
in an officer’s mind as to what he can search incident to the 
arrest. An arrestee could have a weapon hidden in any part of 
the bedroom, and could attempt to gain access to it at any time. 
If Gant is applied to non-vehicular searches, and the arrestee is 
secured, the scope of the search will be extremely limited. If 
Gant is not applied to non-vehicular searches, the “immediate 
 
249. Id. at 351. 
250. Id. at 335. 
251. Id. at 351. 
252. Some argue that the effect of Gant with respect to vehicular 
searches is not terribly significant since other exceptions could validate a 
search of the automobile even after the arrestee has been secured. See Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Brian S. Batterton, What Exactly 
Can We Do In Light of Gant?, PUBLIC AGENCY TRAINING COUNCIL, 
http://www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_update/az_v_gant_guidelines.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2012); Albert L. Wysocki, Searches Following Arrest: The 
Implications of Arizona v. Gant, 24-7 PRESS RELEASE (June 11, 2009), 
http://www.24-7pressrelease.com/press-release/searches-following-arrest-the-
implications-of-arizona-v-gant-103577.php. 
29
DE Sena Final 2/28/2013 11:38 PM 
460 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
control” test from Chimel v. California would govern, and 
anything in the arrestee’s immediate control or lunging 
distance could be searched, regardless of whether he or she was 
secured.253 The Court, in Chimel, stated, “[a] gun on a table or 
in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous 
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the 
person arrested.”254 This seems to be the rule regardless of 
whether the arrestee is handcuffed or secured, since handcuffs 
are not failsafe and a handcuffed arrestee can still be 
dangerous.255 In this non-vehicular context, however, if Gant 
was applied, the search of a nightstand a few feet away from a 
secured arrestee would not be allowed, since it would not be 
reasonable to think he could gain access to the nightstand.256 
The importance of whether Gant applies to non-vehicular 
searches is therefore apparent, as the effect would be to greatly 
limit searches incident to an arrest and place officers in a 
quandary about what can be searched and what cannot be 
searched.257 This is quite contrary to the bright-line rule of 
Chimel that existed before the Gant decision.258 Officers should 
not have to analyze these difficult questions during these 
dangerous situations, but rather should have clear rules to 
follow. The bright-line rule of Chimel therefore would be more 
appropriate with regard to non-vehicular searches. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The seminal case of Arizona v. Gant has completely 
revamped the rules applicable to searches incident to arrests in 
the automobile context, and has created more fact sensitive 
issues than existed before under the law set forth in New York 
v. Belton.259 Thus, when important issues as to the validity of 
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searches hinge on variable factual issues, uncertainty is the 
result, especially for law enforcement as to what exactly the 
rules are. In addition, since Gant involved an automobile 
search, uncertainty has also arisen as to its application to 
searches incident to arrests which do not involve automobiles. 
Lower courts, including two circuit courts, have come to 
different conclusions as to Gant’s applicability for non-
vehicular searches incident to arrests.260 It remains to be seen 
if the circuits will ultimately resolve this disparate treatment 
of the Gant ruling, or whether the Supreme Court will settle 
this issue at some future point in time. 
 
260. United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010); see supra Part III. 
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